|Nombre:||Coordinated Effects in Merger Cases|
Mergers can give rise to two types of anticompetitive effects: unilateral effects and coordinated effects. The latter arise if after a merger, firms can increase their market power by coordinating their actions. The objective of this Report is to explain what coordinated effects are and how they can be identified, our ultimate aim being to offer practical guidance to antitrust agencies in their analysis of mergers. We review the economic meaning of collusion, and assess the factors that allow firms to reach and enforce collusive outcomes. We also review some approaches for quantifying coordinated effects, and provide an overview of European mergers cases involving coordinated effects.
|Nombre:||Coordinated EffectS_word_25-02-13 V2 RCAL.pdf|
|Tipo:||pdf (Mime Type: application/pdf)|
|Createdo el:||02/25/2013 00:00|
|Última actualización el:||07/08/2014 13:20|
|Página de inicio:|